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ABSTRACT
The essay deals with some of the problems concerning the use of statistics in eviden-
tiary inferences. Limits and conditions of such a use are explained, with reference to 
the modern theory of evidence and proof. 
Keywords: Evidence Law, Legal Proof, Statistics.Autor convidado.
NOTES ABOUT 
STATISTICAL EVIDENCE
Este artigo aborda alguns dos problemas concernentes ao uso da estatística em infe-
rências probatórias. Os limites e as condições de tal uso são explicadas, com referên-
cia à teoria moderna da prova. 
Palavras-chave: Direito Probatório, Prova Legal, Estatística. 
1. INFERENCES AND DECISION
These notes do not deal with the whole complex problem of “forensic 
statistics”, on which there is a relevant amount of literature1. Rather, 
they are aimed at stressing some doubtful and disputable topics that 
should be considered when the use of statistics in judicial processes 
is analyzed.
A first set of relevant questions arises when one deals with the 
basic problem of any judicial decision, that is: the inference – or, 
more frequently – the set of inferences that are based upon the 
relevant evidence at hand and the conclusion concerning the truth or 
1 See mainly FROSINI, 2002.
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falseness of the statements concerning the facts in issue. However, 
before dealing with such basic problems a couple of premises should 
be clarified. One of these premises is that the decision about those 
facts is not conceived as an irrational and merely subjective spiritual 
act, as it is with the intime conviction of the French criminal system2, 
but – rather – as a reasoning made according with rational models 
and logical principles. Then it may be interpreted as a set of logical 
inferences3. The second prem is that when one speaks of judicial 
truth there is no reference to any idea of “absolute” truth, that is of 
something that cannot be achieved in any judicial process (as well 
as in other areas of human experience and even of science). Then 
the judicial truth has to be intended as a relative truth, not in the 
subjective sense that each individual has his own personal truth, but 
in the objective sense that any conclusion about the facts in issue is 
based upon the evidence that is available in each specific case. Then 
such a truth is a matter of degree depending on such evidence, or – as 
it may be said – a matter of approximation to the unattainable “true” 
truth of those facts. That’s why this idea may also be expressed in 
terms of probable truth or of probability of truthfulness of the factual 
statements4.
On the basis of these premises the fundamental problem may be 
stated in these terms: whether, and if yes in which way, the reference 
to statistics may be used as evidence concerning a specific individual 
fact (for instance: a particular causal connection), that is usually 
the subject matter of a judicial case5. Of course this problem arises 
because the common opinion is that statistics refer to a frequency 
of a situation within a given relevant population or set of cases 
and are useful for predictions, although predicting a specific fact is 
extremely difficult6, but they cannot say anything about individual 
past events7. Then the problem may be interpreted as dealing 
with the structure of the legal connection between statistics and 
conclusions concerning the specific fact in issue.
2 See TARUFFO, 2009, p. 87, 161 and 244.
3 See TARUFFO, 2009, p. 207.
4 On these complex topics see again TARUFFO, 2009, p. 74 and 90.
5 But for different situations see infra, 3.
6 See FROSINI, 2002, p. 22.
7 See FROSINI, 2002, p. 9 and 149.




























































1.1 Naked Statistical Evidence?
The problem of the inferences connecting rationally the evidence 
at hand with a conclusion concerning the facts in issue may be 
interpreted – and actually is interpreted – on the basis of various 
conceptual models. A complete analysis of all these models cannot 
be made here, then a specific attention will be paid only to those 
models in which statistics may be or are actually used.
First of all, however, one of these models may be set aside 
immediately, that is: the theory according to which the so-called 
naked statistical evidence may support a conclusion about the facts 
in issue even when there is no other evidence. It is a well-known 
and disputed theory8, but a full discussion of it is not relevant here, 
because of at least two reasons. One is that in the administration of 
justice there is no interest in paradoxes as those of the blue bus or 
the public of a rodeo9. The judge does not play with paradoxes: he 
has to deal with specific and concrete empirical facts that occurred 
in the past. Another reason is that – as it is commonly said – statistics 
have nothing to say about specific past facts, since they deal with 
populations or sets of events and – moreover – are oriented towards 
the future rather than towards the past10. This does not prevent, of 
course, the reference to statistics in the analysis of the evidence, but 
it shows that naked statistics cannot be taken as an autonomous and 
sufficient item of evidence.
1.2 Bayesian Probability?
Among the approaches to the problem of judicial decision on facts 
there is a very well-known theory that has been developed in the 
last decades mainly – but not only11 – in the United States, according 
to which the evidentiary inferences should be made in terms of 
quantitative probability, and mainly by applying the so-called Bayes’ 
theorem. In this way, it is said, the judge may arrive at a conclusion in 
terms of a percent degree of probability of the statement concerning 
the fact in issue. The problem that would be solved in this way is to 
establish which one, among various hypotheses (or among several 
8 See FROSINI, 2002, p. 12 and 65.
9 About these paradoxes see FROSINI, 2002, p. 86, also for other references.
10 See e.g. FROSINI, 2002, p.17.
11 In the Italian literature see mainly GARBOLINO. See also FROSINI, 2002, p. 45; TARUFFO, 
1992, p. 169.
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causes) is most probably connected with this statement. In this 
model, the function of statistics is to provide a priori probabilities 
concerning the different hypotheses (or causes) about an event, and 
the theorem permits to determine the a posteriori probability of this 
event in connection with the relatively best hypothesis or cause12.
There is no doubt about the mathematical validity of the Bayes’ 
theorem that actually is used in a broad variety of contexts. The 
problem, however, is to understand whether the Bayesian calculus 
may be taken – as its supporters say – as the general model of the 
judge’s reasoning about the evidence. If the question is stated in 
such general terms, the answer cannot be but negative, for several 
reasons. One of these reasons is that only sometimes – but for sure 
not always – the judge has to decide which is the more probable 
evidence or the more probable cause of an event. When, as it 
more often happens – the judge has just to establish whether a fact 
occurred or did not occur on the basis of some items of evidence at 
hand, there is no problem about alternative hypotheses or various 
possible causes of that fact. The problem may simply be to establish 
whether a fact X (the only possible cause) provoked or did not 
provoke the effect Y (i.e. the fact in issue). In all these cases, it seems 
that there is no possible use of the Bayes’ theorem13.
But even assuming that the theorem could be hypothetically applied, 
its use may be impossible. Here the problem is that in many – or 
most – cases in a judicial context there are no statistics to be used as 
probabilities a priori, because of the simple fact that such information 
is lacking. Then the Bayesian calculus cannot be performed14. In order 
to save this possibility even when an objective statistical information 
is not at hand, it is sometimes said that one should use subjective 
evaluations of the frequency of a given hypothesis or cause, and 
such estimates should be taken as probabilities a priori upon which 
the calculus could be based15. But even admitting hypothetically that 
in some contexts such a subjective version of probability may be 
accepted, this is not the case of judicial contexts. On the one hand, in 
fact, the decision has to be made by the judge on the basis of objective 
12  See e.g. GARBOLINO, 2014, p. 88; FROSINI, 2002, p. 49.
13  See FROSINI, 2002, p. 99.
14  More broadly see TARUFFO, 1992, p. 175.
15  See e.g. GARBOLINO, 2014, p. 92 and 95; FROSINI, 2002, p. 53 and 98.




























































items of evidence assessed in a rational and controllable way, not on 
the basis of the judge’s subjective biases and personal evaluations of 
any merely supposed frequency of any event. On the other hand, it 
is well known that one of the most frequent fallacies in the common 
reasoning is just that of quantifying arbitrarily and subjectively any 
supposed frequency of anything16. In a word: inventing nonexistent 
and fictitious statistics is a very bad kind of reasoning.
Moreover, one of the last supporters of the Bayesian method for 
judicial decisions underlines that up to date the development of 
the theory has reached only the situation in which there is just one 
specific item of evidence, but that the theory is not yet applicable 
when there are several items of evidence17. Unfortunately for the 
theory, however, the reality of judicial processes is that usually there 
are several – and in some cases many – different items of evidence, 
with the further problem that some of them are favorable and some 
are contrary to a specific conclusion about the facts in issue. This 
means that even if one accepts the Bayesian theory, he cannot apply 
it in a large number of cases: therefore, once again it cannot be taken 
as a general model for judicial decisions.
2. INFERENTIAL MODELS
A more positive and fruitful approach to the problem of the judicial 
use of statistics requires a due consideration of the inferences by 
which evidence is connected to a conclusion concerning the facts in 
issue. The set of such inferences is sometimes very complex and may 
be analyzed by means of different logical models. However, such an 
analysis cannot be properly developed here. Therefore, for sake of 
simplicity, attention may be paid just to two of the main models of 
inferences in which statistics may be involved.
One of these models is the Hempel’s model of a nomological-
deductive inference. It is relevant in the theory of judicial decision 
mainly because of the reference made by Federico Stella18. This 
kind of inference is so called because it connects a premise with 
a conclusion on the basis of a general covering law, and therefore 
16  See NISBETT and ROSS, 1989, p. 55, 123, 159 and 228; TARUFFO, 1992, p. 176.
17  See GARBOLINO, 2014, p. 310.
18  See STELLA, 2003, p. 239. See also TARUFFO, 2012, p. 226 and FROSINI, 2006, p. 307.
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the conclusion is certain in a deductive way. So far, however, we are 
simply dealing with a modern version of the Aristotelian syllogism, 
and there is no problem of statistics. The problem arises when the 
reference is made to a quasi nomological-deductive model, which 
is to a probabilistic version of the original model. It happens when 
there is not a covering general law, but there is a statistical frequency 
of the connection between premise and conclusion, and such a 
frequency has an especially high value (of 90% or even more). In such 
a case it is said that the conclusion may be considered as practically 
certain, since its truth is highly probable. There are, however, some 
criticisms that can be addressed to this theory. On the one hand, it 
may be said that it does not represent what normally happens in 
judicial contexts, where the reference to general laws, but also to 
very high probabilities, is not impossible but is not frequent. Then 
this model cannot be taken as a general model of judicial inferences.
On the other hand, the role of statistics in such a model deserves 
to be properly defined. It seems clear that if there are statistics 
suggesting that A provokes B in 95% of the cases, it provides a good 
reasonable justification for believing that most probably A provoked 
B also in the specific case. But it would be incorrect to say that in 
such a case the occurrence of B has a 95% probability, since statistics 
provide frequencies but do not say anything about a specific 
instance. Rather, it could be said that in such a case the statistical 
frequency offers a nice justification for a practical decision. In other 
words, a judge would be reasonably justified in taking the conclusion 
of the inference as if such a statement were highly probable, and to 
behave as if it were true. However, it is said that to speak of practical 
certainty is possible only when the probability is higher than 99%19.
It seems, therefore, that the reference to statistics may play a relevant 
role in providing a rational justification for judicial decisions, but 
here a further problem arises. Actually such a justification may be 
rational when the probability at stake is very high (that is when the 
statistical information is quasi general) mainly because in such cases 
the rate of error is very low, and then the probability of a wrong 
decision is also very low, or at any rate tolerable. But what about 
the much more frequent case in which the statistical frequency is 
19  See FROSINI, 2002, p. 130.




























































lower (for instance, of 80% or 70%), and then taking the conclusion 
of the inference “as if it were true” has a much higher probability to 
be wrong? Moreover: what about the case in which the statistical 
frequency is low or very low (for instance 30% or 20%), with the 
corresponding high probability of error concerning the conclusion20?
In a sense, and in general, it could be roughly said that the degree of 
confidence (or of belief) in the truthfulness of the conclusion depends 
on the degree of probability of the statistics that are used as the 
basis of the inference. Then, if this degree is low, the conclusion of 
the inference cannot be taken as reliable, and the inference cannot 
be taken as an independent and sufficient item of evidence.
This does not mean that only statistics with high probabilities should 
be used, since also low probabilities may be useful21. However, an 
important aspect of the problem is whether and when statistics 
may or may not be sufficient to achieve the standard of proof that 
is required in each specific case22, although it may be admitted that 
even “low” statistics may be sometimes relevant as a support of a 
conclusion about the facts in issue23. Here the main problem is to 
establish whether or not several statistics, each one not sufficient 
per se to support a conclusion, may be combined in a coherent set 
of inferences, so that a conclusion about a causal connection may be 
finally justified24.
Similar remarks can be made about another logical model of 
inference that is used in epistemology and also in the analysis of 
judicial decisions25. It is the type of inference studied by Stephen 
Toulmin26, according to which a hypothesis H may be supported by 
an evidence E on the basis of a warrant W. This type of inference 
may be considered as the simple and atomic element that – in 
various combinations – forms complex sets of inferences, in 
various contexts and even in the judicial reasoning about evidence 
and factual hypotheses27. It is clear that the most important 
20  About the medium-low frequencies see STELLA, 2003, p. 350.
21  But see infra, 3.1., and STELLA, 2003, p. 350.
22  About the standards of proof see infra, 4.
23  See STELLA, 2003, p. 350.
24  For a positive answer see HAACK, 2014, p. 209, 218, 222, 225.
25  See e.g. HAACK, 2003, p. 60; GONZÁLEZ LAGIER, 2013, 55; TARUFFO, 2009, p. 207.
26  See TOULMIN, 2008, p. 91.
27  See mainly TARUFFO, 2009, p. 209.
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factor of the inference is the warrant, since the conclusion about 
H depends essentially on it28. When the W is a general law, once 
again we have a version of the syllogism and the conclusion is that 
H is deductively certain. But at least two problems arise when W is 
something different.
One of these problems deals with the case in which W is 
a generalization. If, following Frederick Schauer, there is a 
generalization that corresponds with a universal law29, once again 
the inference has a deductive character. In other cases, there may 
be a generalization that is not properly general but that corresponds 
to what is considered as “normal”, more frequent and familiar, in 
the given situation. Here the inference is not deductive but if such 
generalizations are used as W in the Toulmin model, the conclusion 
may be that H is reasonably justified30. But of course this does not 
happen when the generalization is spurious, being devoid of any 
epistemic meaning and of any correspondence with the reality31. In 
such a case, of course, this kind of warrant cannot give any outcome 
in terms of rational justification of H. Then the problem is that in 
each case in which common sense generalization (corresponding to 
the Italian notion of massime d’esperienza)32 are used as W, their 
nature and meaning, and their epistemic foundation, has to be 
carefully checked and eventually denied, since – as William Twining 
writes33 – the “stock of knowledge” that is typical of common sense 
is an “ill-defined agglomerate of beliefs”, that is a “complex soup 
of more or less well-grounded information, sophisticated models, 
anecdotal memories, impressions, stories, myths, proverbs, wishes, 
stereotypes, speculations and prejudices”.
The situation may be less complex and uncertain when there are 
statistics that may be used as W, but here again a relevant problem 
arises. As it was said above, a statistical frequency with a high (how 
much?) probability may provide a good practical reason to take H as 
confirmed “as if it were true”, and then it may be used as a W. But 
28  See e.g. TARUFFO, 2009, p. 208.
29  See SCHAUER, 2003, p. 7.
30  See SCHAUER, 2003, p. 7, 10, 55 and 108.
31  See SCHAUER, 2003, p. 7, 12, 17, 137 and 152.
32  About such a notion, which is common also to other procedural cultures, see TARUFFO, 
2012, p. 225; TARUFFO, 2009, p. 210.
33  See TWINING, 2006, p. 338.
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then an open question deals once more with frequencies lower than 
“quasi 100%”, and also, in general, with low frequencies. In these 
cases, in fact, the best that can be said is that such statistics provide 
a low level of W, and then they do not offer a sufficient confirmation 
– if taken alone – of H.
3. SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE
The domain in which the use of statistics is by far more frequent is 
that of the so-called scientific evidence. Actually in the last decades, 
and mainly after the Daubert decision issued in 1993 by the Supreme 
Court of the United States34, this kind of evidence as become almost 
usual in the civil and criminal justice of several countries. The need 
for the trier of fact (judge or juror) to use scientific knowledge that 
does not belong to his culture, since he is only an “average man” 
from this point of view, has become a daily duty when the case needs 
to be properly and carefully decided with reference to the facts in 
issue. On the other hand, the great development of many branches 
of science, mainly – but not only – in various areas of medicine and 
genetics, provides a wide array of techniques that may be useful, 
and then should be used, in order to make such a decision.
The literature concerning such a complex and evolving phenomenon 
is immense, in the United States as well as in other countries, but 
a fair overview may be achieved by looking at the 1.000 pages of 
a basic text in which several essays are collected about the main 
examples of scientific evidence and some of the problems they raise. 
It is the Reference Manual on Scientific Evidence. It includes essays 
concerning several types of scientific evidence, such as DNA test35, 
exposure science36, epidemiology37, toxicology38, neurosciences39 
and mental health40, but also about evidence of economic damages41 
34  The literature about Daubert and its effect is immense and includes thousands of essays 
and dozens of books. In the Italian literature see e.g. STELLA, 2003, p. 458; FROSINI, 2002, p. 41; 
DOMINIONI, 2005, p. 137; TARUFFO, 1996; DONDI, 1996.
35  KAYE and SENSABAUG, 2011, p. 129.
36  RODRIKS, 2011, p. 503.
37  GREEN, FRIEDMAN and GORDIS, 2011, p. 549.
38  GOLDSTEIN and HENIFIN, 2011, p. 633.
39  GREELY and WAGNER, 2011, p. 747.
40  APPELBAUM, 2011, p. 813.
41  ALLEN, HALL and LAZEAR, 2011, p. 426.




























































and engineering42. Moreover, there are also essays concerning 
the use of statistics43 and multiple regressions44, considering the 
great importance of such calculations in all the areas of scientific 
evidence. However, in the modern idea of science other areas of 
knowledge that are not considered in the Manual are included, such 
as psychology, sociology, economy, anthropology, and so forth.
Considering the variety and the dimensions of what we now call 
scientific evidence, it is clearly impossible to try to develop here a 
detailed analysis of the role that statistics have in all these different 
domains. However, some general aspects of the phenomenon 
deserve to be stressed.
A first important aspect is that each science – hard or human – and 
even each specific branch of every science, has its own particular 
paradigms, protocols and methods of inquiry, with the obvious 
consequence that they provide different kinds of knowledge, with 
different degrees of epistemic support, and then different kinds of 
evidence. There is no unique and common scientific method, and 
therefore there is no unique idea or theory of scientific knowledge: 
correspondingly, even the idea of scientific evidence is fragmented 
into a lot of different kinds of information. This is the fundamental 
problem of scientific evidence, at least after Daubert, considering 
that – according with the principles affirmed in this judgment – 
any item of evidence is admitted into a judicial process only if it 
is scientifically valid and fits with the particular facts in issue as a 
possibly useful information about them. When statistics are used 
as an evidence, or as a part of the inquiry leading to any kind of 
scientific evidence, they must be reliable, properly calculated, 
correctly interpreted and carefully analyzed from the point of view 
of their relevance for a decision about the facts in issue45.
The necessary reference to the facts of the case leads to another 
important problem, which deals with the evidentiary use of 
statistics. A good example of this problem is the use of statistics in 
epidemiology, mainly when the decision deals with the causation 
42  ROBERTSON, MOALLI and BLACK, 2011, p. 897.
43  KAYE and FREEDMAN, 2011, p. 211.
44  RUBINFELD, 2011, p. 303.
45  See mainly KAYE and FREEDMAN, 2011, p. 216, 230, 240 and 260, but these aspects are 
analyzed in all the specific essays included in the Manual.
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between facts. In most cases, actually, a judicial case deals with a 
specific and individual factual situation, such as: “at the time t in 
the place p the fact f provoked the effect e”. Then this would be a 
case of individual or specific causation in which a particular event is 
taken as the cause of a particular consequence. But epidemiology 
deals essentially with the so-called general causation, that is with 
the statistical frequency of the occurrence of a “type” of event (that 
is “facts of the kind A provoke the effect of the type E in the X% of 
cases representing the relevant population”)46. Then the problem is 
that (except what we shall see later….) an epidemiological statistical 
frequency has nothing to say about the probability of the causal 
connection in a case of specific causation. This is not to say that 
such a frequency is completely useless, but it means that it is no 
sufficient, per se, to prove the individual causation47.
On the other hand, the statistical evidence of a general causation 
may be used directly – so to speak – as an evidence when the subject 
matter of the case deals with the risk or the increasing risk of damages 
provoked for instance by the exposure to dangerous materials, by the 
use of toxic medicament or by environmental pollution. Such a risk 
may be the subject matter of the case, for instance when a factory 
is sanctioned for not introducing protective measures preventing 
pollution or intoxication. In such cases the risk of damage – an 
example of general causation – is properly the main fact in issue, and 
then the epidemiological evidence may provide directly the proof of 
this fact. In general terms, so to speak, statistics may be properly used 
as evidence when the case does not deal with specific past events 
of individual causation, but deals with future probabilities of the 
occurrence of given events in a given population, since in these cases 
the frequency of such events in just a relevant aspect of the decision. 
Something similar happens when the case is a class action dealing 
with mass torts, when the number of individual harms cannot be 
established in a specific way, and then the dimension of the damages 
has to be determined by means of statistics concerning the population 
exposed to the risk48.
46  See e.g. KAYE and FREEDMAN, 2011, p. 551 and 597, FROSINI, 2002, p. 37; STELLA, 2003,  
p. 294.
47  About low epidemiological frequencies see STELLA, 2003, p. 352.
48  See TARUFFO, 2016; GIUSSANI, 2016.




























































3.1 A Doubtful Example: Toxic Torts
Toxic torts are the domain in which the reference to statistics, 
mainly provided by epidemiology, is most frequent. However, it 
is also the domain in which the use of statistical evidence raises 
several problems49.
First of all, it is commonly said that in the cases concerning 
toxic torts the general causation of the toxic effects of the use 
of dangerous medicaments or of the exposure to dangerous 
materials needs to be properly demonstrated, and then the 
specific causation of such effects in individual cases50. As to the 
proof of general causation there are no special problems since 
– as abovementioned – statistics may provide such a proof. The 
problem arises concerning the proof of specific causation: it is 
usually said that statistical probabilities have nothing to say about 
specific causation51, but sometimes it is also said that statistics 
may prove such a causation, since they could provide a proof that 
achieves the civil standard of the preponderance of evidence, that 
is a probability of at least 51%52.
Several American courts have accepted this theory53. The main 
argument is – in extreme synthesis – the following: if the relative 
risk of disease of those who used the medicament or were 
exposed to the dangerous material54 is two times the risk of the 
non-users or unexposed, therefore in such cases there would be 
a proof of the specific causation in the individual cases, because 
the standard of the more probable than not has been achieved. 
Moreover, sometimes it is said that the statistics showing the 
double risk are a sufficient proof of the specific causation, and 
sometimes it is even said that such statistics are necessary to 
prove such causation55.
49  See e.g. FROSINI, 2002, p. 59.
50  See GREEN, FREEDMAN and GORDIS, 2011, p. 552.
51  See e.g. RUBINFELD, 2011, p. 319.
52  About this standard see infra, 4.
53  See GREEN, FREEDMAN and GORDIS, 2011, p. 608, and broadly HAACK, 2014, p. 264, also 
for specific and analytical references.
54  The relative risk is the ratio between the rate of diseases in those who used the 
medicament or were exposed and the rate of the same disease among non-users or non-
exposed. See GREEN, FREEDMAN and GORDIS, 2011, p. 566.
55  For analytical references and an analysis of such cases see HAACK, 2014.




























































There is no need to develop here a thorough analysis of this 
argument, but some critical remarks are necessary, notwithstanding 
the positive opinion shared by several courts and by some writers56.
First of all, one may be inclined to believe that if – for instance 
– the non-users of the medicament or the nonexposed suffer 
the disease in the proportion of 5% of the relevant population, 
and the users or the exposed suffer the same disease two times 
more (that is with a risk of 2), the outcome would be that for the 
users or the exposed the risk of such a disease is of 10%, but this 
would not say anything about the specific causation concerning 
particular individuals. It would just be information about the 
general causation in the population of the users or of the exposed, 
but nothing more. After all, a probability of 10% of risk for users 
and exposed may be relevant within the general assessment of 
evidence, but it is in no way equivalent to a probability of 50% in 
any case of specific causation.
On the other hand, even admitting that the double risk produces 
a probability of 50% in specific cases, this does not mean that the 
standard of the preponderance of evidence (or of the more probable 
than not) is achieved: 50% is not preponderant upon another 50%, 
then with 50% of probability the proof is not reached.
Moreover, in a recent essay57 Susan Haack provides various 
epistemological arguments showing that the double risk is neither 
necessary nor sufficient to prove a specific causation. It is not 
necessary because such causation may be demonstrated, by any 
other kind of evidence, even when the double risk does not exist, 
as when, for instance, it is of 1,9 or even lower. In such cases the 
reference to the ratio of the risk may be useful together with other 
evidence, but it is never decisive and should not necessarily be of 
2. The double risk is not sufficient because the statistical frequency 
of the risk is not per se a proof of what happened in specific cases. 
Therefore, once again, the knowledge of such a frequency may be 
useful if considered as a concurring information in the context of all 
the evidence available, but individual causation is not demonstrated 
only by the double risk.
56  See again GREEN, FREEDMAN and GORDIS, 2011, p. 611; HAACK, 2014, p. 269.
57  See HAACK, 2014, p. 264 and 285.
(...) sometimes 
it is said that 
the statistics 
showing the 
double risk are a 
sufficient proof 
of the specific 
causation, and 
sometimes it is 
even said that 
such statistics 
are necessary 
to prove such 
causation. 




























































4. STANDARDS OF PROOF
Every time in which one speaks of the “sufficiency” of the evidence 
to support a conclusion about the facts in issue the problem is to 
establish when the evidence available is or is not sufficient for this 
purpose. In the legal language it is the problem of the so called 
standard of proof, that is of the threshold that should be achieved 
– by the evidentiary inferences – in order to conclude that the 
fact has been duly proven, that is: that the statement concerning 
such a fact has received a proper degree of logical confirmation (or 
justification) by the evidence at hand. Here the problem is relevant 
because in several cases the standards of proof are defined in terms 
of statistical probabilities.
However, as a preliminary remark it should be underlined that in 
several procedural systems – mainly in the civil law area – there are 
no numerical definitions of these standards, and the decision about 
whether or not a sufficient degree of proof of the facts in issue has 
been reached is left to a discretionary assessment of the trier of fact 
(usually a professional judge). In some cases, and the main example 
is the French criminal procedure, such a judgment is left to so-called 
intime conviction of the judge or of the jurors, that is to a merely 
subjective and basically irrational decision. In other cases, such as 
in the Italian and Spanish civil procedure, it is assumed that such 
an evaluation is made rationally58, i.e. by applying rational criteria 
(such as the Spanish sana crítica)59, but no numerical or probabilistic 
standards are established.
Correspondingly, the homeland of statistical standards are the 
common law systems, and specially the American one, but they are 
a very common point of reference even for other systems, and then 
some remarks are deserved here.
A very well-known standard for a criminal judgment, which is 
followed in more or less explicit ways also in other systems, as 
for instance in Italy after a recent reform60, says that a criminal 
condemnation is possible if and only if the defendant’s liability is 
established beyond any reasonable doubt (BARD). Such a standard 
58  About the Italian system see TARUFFO, 2011, p. 519.
59  See ABEL LLUCH, 2015, p. 54, 86 and 113.
60  See e.g. STELLA, 2003, p. 154 and 195; FROSINI, 2002, p. 121; GARBOLINO, 2014, p. 461.




























































belongs to the history of common law61 and it is used in several 
judgments of the American Supreme Court, beginning mainly in the 
Seventies62. In the present context it is not relevant in itself, since it 
may be interpreted simply by saying that it is better to acquit a guilty 
defendant than to condemn an innocent, but mainly because it is 
often interpreted in probabilistic terms, by saying for instance that 
it establishes a 90% or a 95% degree of proof of guilt as a minimum 
threshold required for condemnation. This interpretation of the 
BARD standard is very common but it is very doubtful, and there 
are various reasons to reject it. One of these reasons, argued very 
convincingly by Larry Laudan63, is that any numerical quantification 
of the standard is meaningless. In particular, what seems impossible 
is weighing in a numerical or statistical scale the reasonability of 
the doubt concerning the guilt of the defendant. Therefore, as it 
argued by Jordi Ferrer64, whether a doubt is reasonable should be 
established according to rational, not numerical, criteria.
In civil cases the common law, and mainly the American system, 
apply the standard of the preponderance of evidence, according 
to which the factual hypothesis proposed by the plaintiff has to be 
accepted if its degree of proof is higher than the degree of proof 
of the defendant’s hypothesis. This standard is interesting in the 
present context because it is commonly said that it means that one 
of the two hypotheses should have at least a 0.51 (or a 51%) of 
probability, and consequently the opposed hypothesis should have 
at best a probability of 0.49 (or of 49%). For this reason it is usually 
said that the standard is of the most probable than not65.
This theory is widely accepted by the American courts (not by the 
English ones)66, but it seems almost meaningless to a thorough 
analysis. On the one hand, it is based on the assumption – which is 
typical of the American culture of the adversarial process – according 
to which in any case the judge has always to make a choice between 
61  See SHAPIRO, 1999, p. 1.
62  See mainly STELLA, 2003, p. 156.
63  See LAUDAN, 2006, p. 29.
64  See FERRER BELTRÁN, 2007, p. 144.
65  In the wide literature about the subject see e.g. MORGAN, 1962, p. 21; CLERMONT, 2013, p. 
16; CLERMONT, 2012, p. 60, LILLY, 1996, p. 55; REDMAYNE, 1999, p. 167; JAMES, HAZARD and 
LEUBSDORF, 1992, p. 339.
66  See REDMAYNE, 1999, p. 174.




























































the plaintiff’s and the defendant’s factual hypotheses. This does 
not work in other systems (or in other cultures), in which other 
hypotheses about the facts in issue may be considered, including 
also the judge’s own “third” hypothesis67. But the most important 
problem of this theory is the implicit assumption that the plaintiff’s 
and the defendant’s versions of the facts are complementary, so that 
if one version is more probable the other has to be correspondingly 
less probable, and vice versa. Only assuming this premise, in fact, 
it may be said that if the plaintiff’s version is proven at 0.51 then 
the defendant’s one has only a probability of 0.49, and therefore 
should be rejected. But this statement is incorrect: actually in many 
cases the two hypotheses are not complementary and are simply 
different. Imagine, for instance, that the plaintiff says (A) “Peter 
provoked to me a damage of 1,000”, and Peter says (B) “yes, but I 
paid 1,000 to the plaintiff”. Both A and B may be true, or both may 
be false, and therefore the degree of probability of one hypothesis 
does not depend on the degree of probability of the other. Then, if 
one wants to think in terms of complementary probabilities he has 
to think of a positive hypothesis (A is true) and the corresponding 
negative hypothesis (A is false), since only in this case if A is true at 
0.51 then A is false at 0.49, or vice versa. Then the correct way of 
interpreting the standard is the rule of the more probable than not, 
as it is said to be – but in a doubtful way – the real meaning of the 
preponderance of evidence.
Even in this case, however, things are not easy. On the one hand, and 
using the same example, A may be more probable than its negative, 
and then should be accepted, but also B may be more probable than 
its negative, and then should also be accepted. And so what? The 
decision has to be taken according to legal rules determining the legal 
consequences of such a situation, not according to complementary 
probabilities. Only when A has a probability at least of 0,51 or higher 
upon its negative, and B’s negative has a probability of more than 
0.51 A will prevail on B, but only because of legal reasons.
On the other hand, all this way of reasoning is based upon the 
assumption that probabilities from 0 to 1 may be ascribed to 
any factual hypothesis, but it is not so. Notwithstanding the 
67  See TARUFFO, 2009, p. 32.




























































efforts of American courts and common law scholars, it has to be 
acknowledged that there are no methods that can be properly used 
in order to determine the numerical values of the preponderance 
of evidence or of the more probable than not of one or another 
factual hypothesis68.
At any rate, determining standards of proof is a fundamental need 
in any rational theory of judicial decisions, since the standard 
establishes whether and when the proof of the facts in issue has 
been achieved. This does not mean that the American standards 
should be taken as models, and also it does not mean that there 
should be different standards for criminal cases and for civil cases. 
Rather, it may be admitted that several standards of proof may be 
determined, mainly depending on the kind of error distribution that 
is accepted in any particular situation, and on the basis of several 
factors such as the value of the amount or the kind of the sanction 
at stake, the different steps of the judicial proceedings, and so forth. 
The most important point to stress here is that this is not a theoretical 
problem: this is a matter for policy options that the lawgivers should 
make for the various situations in which a decision about the facts in 
issue has to be made.
68  See JAMES, HAZARD and LEUBSDORF, 1992, p. 339.
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